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OFFICIOUS INTERMEDDLING OR PROTECTED FIRST
AMENDMENT ACTIVITY? THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
PROHIBITORY CHAMPERTY LAW AFTER CITIZENS UNITED
Bradley C. Tobias*
Only once was Judge Taylor ever seen at a dead standstill in open
court, and the Cunninghams stopped him. Old Sarum, their stamp-
ing grounds, was populated by two families separate and apart in
the beginning, but unfortunately bearing the same name. The
Cunninghams married the Coninghams until the spelling of the
names was academic “academic until a Cunningham disputed a
Coningham over land titles and took to the law. During a contro-
versy of this character, Jeems Cunningam testified that his mother
spelled it Cunningham on deeds and things, but she was really a
Coningham, she was an uncertain speller, a seldom reader, and was
given to looking far away sometimes when she sat on the front
gallery in the evening. After nine hours of listening to the eccen-
tricities of Old Sarum’s inhabitants, Judge Taylor threw the case
out of court. When asked upon what grounds, Judge Taylor said,
“Champertous connivance,” and declared he hoped to God the
litigants were satisfied by each having their public say. They were.
That was all they had wanted in the first place.1
For many Americans, Harper Lee’s timeless, Pulitzer Prize–winning classic,
To Kill A Mockingbird, is required reading in elementary education, and the phrase
“champertous connivance” frequents many accompanying vocabulary lists paired
with the revered novel. The stoic, cigar-chewing Judge Taylor is portrayed as a fair,
yet practical jurist who enlists Atticus as the defense attorney for Tom Robinson, a
black man who is brought up on baseless charges of rape in Maycomb, Alabama,
during the Jim-Crow era.2 In the passage above, Judge Taylor allows feuding
families to quibble in the public forum, understanding that their claims are likely
frivolous and without merit.3 Without objection from either the Cunninghams or the
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George Washington University. I would like to thank Michelle Sudano for her help and encour-
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1 HARPER LEE, TO KILL A MOCKINGBIRD 165 (1960).
2 See generally id.
3 See id. at 165.
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Coninghams, Judge Taylor disposes of the case on a seemingly obscure ruling of
champertous connivance.4 In fact, given the brief summary of the case, the doctrine
of champerty is likely wholly irrelevant to this small dispute between families over
titles to land. However, this passage illustrates one of the overarching themes of this
Note: the courtroom as a public forum for speech for both litigants and their sup-
porters and the doctrine of champerty as a powerful claim-dispensing weapon and
potential barrier quelling that speech.
In the United States, third-party litigation finance has quickly become a major
global investment market over the past several decades.5 While many legal scholars
have correctly argued for more regulation in third-party litigation to protect against
ethical and financial abuses, one of the biggest obstacles creating uncertainty today
in the viability of large commercial litigation lenders is the number of antiquated
champerty and maintenance statutes6 that are still on the books in most states.
Changing perceptions of litigation, influenced heavily by the Civil Rights movement
during the middle of the century, were instrumental in defining litigation as a form
of political expression and an avenue by which less politically powerful members
of society may seek to enforce their rights.7 Given the political nature of legal ser-
vices, some courts and legal scholars have suggested that outside investment—
either in individual lawsuits or in law firms—may be constitutionally protected.8
The Supreme Court’s careful distinction between litigation as political expression
and litigation for pecuniary gain emanating from its decision in NAACP v. Button9
has likely been blurred in later cases, culminating in the decision in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission,10 which resulted in a ruling that protected unlimited
corporate and union independent expenditures in election campaigns.11 Though Citi-
zens United is a campaign finance case, many have argued, and this Note follows
the same paradigmatic approach, that the broadly sweeping language employed by
Justice Anthony Kennedy can be read to apply outside of the election law context—
to arenas where political speech restrictions may run afoul of First Amendment limits.
This Note will argue that state champerty and maintenance statutes, as they apply to
prohibiting commercial third-party litigation lending activities, are unconstitutional
4 See id.
5 See Maya Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455, 455
(2012) [hereinafter Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract] (“Litigation funding—for-profit,
nonrecourse funding of a litigation by a nonparty—is a new and rapidly developing industry.
It has been described as one of the ‘biggest and most influential trends in civil justice’ today
by RAND, the New York Times, and others.”).
6 See infra Part II for expanded definitions of champerty and maintenance.
7 See infra Part III.
8 See infra Part IV.
9 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
10 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
11 Id. at 365.
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under the First Amendment, as seen with the recent holding in Citizens United,
coupled with changing attitudes towards the nature of litigation.
Part I of this Note delves into the current landscape of the litigation finance
industry in the United States, examining the development of the industry and current
legal and ethical dilemmas facing both litigants and lenders. Preparing for a First
Amendment analysis, Part I pays close attention to the problems that could poten-
tially serve as government interests in a strict scrutiny speech restriction analysis of
categorical prohibitory champerty law. This Note examines the legal, ethical, and
practical problems that come with the territory of third-party litigation finance
agreements. Part II explains the development of First Amendment protection of
litigation and attorney conduct in the United States, starting with Button in 1963 and
tracing Supreme Court First Amendment jurisprudence through commercial speech,
solicitation, and advertising. Part III discusses Citizens United and its effect on the
commercial-speech doctrine and application to categorical champerty laws that
would prohibit commercial litigation financing. In Part III, this Note concludes that
general prohibitory champerty laws that have not been narrowly tailored to allow the
government to curtail the legal and ethical problems that might be associated with
litigation finance are unconstitutional. In applying a post–Citizens United First
Amendment analysis, categorically prohibitory champerty laws are not constitutional.
Finally, the Conclusion suggests ways to protect significant government interests in
preventing legal and ethical problems without categorically prohibiting third-party
litigation finance agreements and promoting a robust litigation finance industry which
can foster bargaining power parity between plaintiffs and defendants and promote a
more just legal system.
I. THE BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE THIRD-PARTY
LITIGATION FINANCE INDUSTRY
A. Development and Current Picture of Third-Party Litigation
Finance in the United States
Commercial litigation finance is a growing industry in the United States with
the potential to attract numerous investors funding plaintiffs claims seeking lucra-
tive returns.12 The concept of third-party commercial litigation finance is relatively
simple: third-party investors advance a sum of money to plaintiffs in civil cases to
fund all or some of their attorney’s fees, and when a settlement or judgment is
reached, the investors take a sizable percentage of the winnings.13 Third-party
12 See, e.g., Kevin M. LaCroix, Litigation Funding: A U.S. Growth Industry?, D&O
DIARY (Apr. 10, 2012), http://www.dandodiary.com/2012/04/articles/securities-litigation
/litigation-funding-a-u-s-growth-industry/.
13 See, e.g., Ashby Jones, On the Burgeoning Industry of Lending for Litigation, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 15, 2010, 9:35 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/11/15/on-the-burgeoning
-industry-of-lending-for-litigation/.
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litigation financing is a not-too-far distant cousin from the contingency-fee model,
in which law firms and attorneys perform legal services conditionally free of charge
to clients unless the case is successful, in such instance the client owes the attorneys
a portion of the judgment or settlement winnings.14 Third-party litigation finance,
on a large scale and commercial level, has arisen as “the recent convergence of un-
favorable economic conditions, the consequent desire for sound investment pros-
pects, and the enormous resources presented by the litigation market have created
the perfect opportunity for the entrepreneurial investor.”15 In its everyday practice,
“funds advanced often come from a group of investors who provide cash to [third-
party litigation funding companies] according to the terms of their underlying in-
vestment agreement.”16 The companies then solicit applicants with pending litigation
claims and advance money to injured parties in cases that are deemed likely to result
in a damages award large enough to repay the amount advanced and reap a profit for
the lender and the investors.17 When the invested parties lose, however, the third-
party litigation lenders forfeit their entire investment because the loans they offer are
nonrecourse: if the financed party loses its case, it is not obligated to pay anything
back to the lender.18 Adding to the attractiveness of third-party litigation financing
for investors is the fact that returns from third-party litigation funding are uncor-
related to rises and falls in markets because cases will be resolved by the judicial
system irrespective of what is happening to asset prices in the wider economy.19
The practice has grown so prevalent and lucrative over the past two decades that
it has attracted some of the world’s largest banks to position themselves into the
business.20 Large scale litigation finance is not native to the United States.21 Third-
party litigation funding first developed in Australia during the early 1990s and soon
spread over to other common-law countries such as the United Kingdom and New
14 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 338 (8th ed. 2004).
15 Jasminka Kalajdzic et al., Justice for Profit: A Comparative Analysis of Australian,
Canadian and U.S. Third Party Litigation Funding, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 93, 127–28 (2013).
16 Julia H. McLaughlin, Litigation Funding: Charting a Legal and Ethical Course, 31
VT. L. REV. 615, 620 (2007).
17 Id.
18 Mariel Rodak, Comment, It’s About Time: A Systems Thinking Analysis of the Liti-
gation Finance Industry and Its Effect on Settlement, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 506–07 (2006).
19 See Claire Madden, Third-Party Commercial Litigation Funding—An Investor’s View,
LAW. (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.thelawyer.com/third-party-commercial-litigation-funding-an
-investors-view/1014815.article (explaining that the potential for a market to develop around
litigation investment is vast).
20 Major banks including Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, and TD Bank have
entered into the business of lawsuit lending. See Binyamin Appelbaum, Putting Money on
Lawsuits, Investors Share in the Payouts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2010, at A20. Some of these
banks finance the specialized lawsuit lender firms, discussed infra, while others lend directly
to lawyers and plaintiffs. Id.
21 See Marco de Morpurgo, A Comparative Legal and Economic Approach to Third-
Party Litigation Funding, 19 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 343, 360 (2011).
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Zealand.22 It also developed in some European civil-law countries such as Germany,
Switzerland, and Austria.23 In the United Kingdom, the growth of litigation finance
has come in two different stages.24 In the first stage, “relatively small operations set
up by former contingency fee lawyers who recognized the demand for such lending
services and oftentimes engaged in predatory lending.”25 These lenders were pri-
marily engaged in small claims, “often in personal injury cases.”26 The second stage,
which is reflective of the modern setting of commercial litigation lending across the
world and in the United States, is populated by institutional investors, including ma-
jor banks and companies specializing in the practice.27 Large specialized companies,
such as Juridica Investments, Ltd., and Burford Capital, make litigation financing
their sole practice28 and have both become publicly traded companies on the London
Stock Exchange’s Alternative Investment Market (AIM).29 These two lenders have
expanded into the United States, investing in a broad range of lawsuits and funding
a number of cases handled by major law firms, including Skadden Arps, Clifford
Chance, Allen & Overy, and Hogan Lovells.30 Between these two litigation invest-
ment behemoths—the largest two in the world in terms of capital—over five-hundred
million dollars in case investment assets are managed.31 Estimation of the amount
of assets managed within the entire industry is difficult, but some industry partici-
pants have estimated that there is over one-billion dollars of funds currently man-
aged for the sole purpose of financing litigation.32 Given the current size and growth
of the market for third-party investment in lawsuits, it is quite plausible that in the
future a secondary market may arise from the trading of shares in litigation.33 This
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 See Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95
MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1277 (2011) [hereinafter Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway?].
25 Id. 
26 Id.
27 Id. at 1276–77.
28 See About Juridica, JURIDICA INVESTMENTS LTD., http://www.juridicainvestments.com
/about-juridica.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2014); Who We Are, BURFORD CAP., http://www
.burfordcapital.com/who-we-are/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
29 See Jason Lyon, Comment, Revolution in Progress: Third-Party Funding of American
Litigation, 58 UCLA L. REV. 571, 572–73 (2010).
30 See Ashby Jones, Third-Party Litigation Funding Stepping up in U.K., WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 20, 2008, 5:20 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/03/20/third-party-litigation-funding
-stepping-up-in-UK/.
31 See About Juridica, JURIDICA INVESTMENTS LTD., http://www.juridicainvestments.com
/about-juridica.aspx (last visited Apr. 15, 2014); Who We Are, BURFORD CAP., http://www
.burfordcapital.com/who-we-are/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
32 See Steinitz, The Litigation Finance Contract, supra note 5, at 459 n.1.
33 See Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway?, supra note 24, at 1282 (“The last couple
of years have also ushered in a secondary market in legal claims. Predominantly, this sec-
ondary market takes the form of litigation-funding firms going public—selling shares to the
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Note is primarily focused on investigating the relationship of the champerty doctrine
with these institutional investors rather than the smaller consumer-oriented lenders.
B. Contrasting Benefits of Third-Party Litigation Finance with
Potential Ethical and Legal Problems
While this Note argues for the implication of striking down state champerty and
maintenance laws barring the practice of third-party litigation, it is important to
understand the context of the debate over the merits of the practice in order to frame
third-party litigation as a form of speech. As will be discussed infra,34 it is vital to
point out the benefits that third-party litigation lenders advance to potential plaintiffs
because these benefits will provide the primary fodder for advancing the idea that
third-party litigation investments are protected by the First Amendment.35 Con-
versely, the potential problems associated with third-party financing will serve later
as government interests that might be asserted in a defense of categorical prohibitory
champerty law under a First Amendment strict scrutiny analysis.
The benefits of third-party litigation financing are clear. In the classic David-
versus-Goliath sense, potential plaintiffs, looking to take on large corporate defen-
dants with vast amounts of capital, will be able to use large third-party litigation
lenders as their slingshot to knock down their by-all-other-accounts heavily favored
opponent.36 In this sense, David-like plaintiffs can have greater access to justice.
When plaintiffs have the financial resources to pursue their cases, they can gain
valuable legal resources, such as access to more elaborate evidence and the best
testifying experts.37 For plaintiffs who find themselves unemployed or at the fringes
of their credit limits, “unable to borrow from banks and other credit-based lending
institutions,” third-party litigation funding provides an essential option for financing
litigation critical to enforcing plaintiffs’ rights.38 In theory, with more capital on its
public and listing on stock exchanges. But it is possible that in the foreseeable future we will
also be witnessing the creation of a new form of securities—legal-claims-backed securities.”
(citation omitted)).
34 See infra Part III.
35 While this Note primarily investigates litigation funding for plaintiffs, it is also available
for defendants. In the David-versus-Goliath paradigm discussed infra, David-like defendants
are able to take on third-party finance to manage their legal footprint in an economically effi-
cient manner.
36 See, e.g., Bruce L. Beron & Jason E. Kinsella, David vs. Goliath Patent Cases: A Search
for the Most Practical Mechanism of Third Party Litigation Financing for Small Plaintiffs,
38 N. KY. L. REV. 605, 608 (2011) (suggesting alternatives “for small private entities and
individuals seeking to assert their legal rights in enforcing high-tech patents they hold against
larger entities”).
37 Appelbaum, supra note 20, at A20.
38 Courtney R. Barksdale, Note, All That Glitters Isn’t Gold: Analyzing the Costs and
Benefits of Litigation Finance, 26 REV. LITIG. 707, 733–34 (2007).
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side, an otherwise financially limited plaintiff can have a higher chance of a case
being truly decided on the merits rather than by a substantial imbalance of resources
between the two sides.39 Additionally, during the course of a lawsuit, a wealthy
defendant will no longer have the option of dragging out the suit with excessive
motions in order “to force the plaintiff to accept an unfair settlement.”40
One particular area of litigation—intellectual-property litigation—is an excellent
vehicle to illustrate the benefits of third-party litigation financing using the David-
versus-Goliath analogy.41 The proverbial small-time garage inventor, although per-
haps a dwindling romantic vision in modern industry, invents a brilliant widget for
which he seeks patent protection. Three years later, after his patent has issued, he
reads in a trade industry magazine that a major company now markets and sells a
widget strikingly similar to the one which the small inventor’s patent covers. Short
on capital and vastly outmanned, the small inventor has few options to turn to if he
wants to enforce his patent against the major company. With a large sum advanced
from a major third-party litigation lender, the garage inventor may hire top market
patent litigation counsel and instantaneously gain leverage over the major company.
Indeed, there are numerous intellectual-property cases where third-party litigation
provides an instrumental role in evening the stakes and creating equilibrium in bar-
gaining power.42
While the benefits of third-party litigation finance are clear, the potential ethical
and financial issues present problems for the practice. On a broad level, some have
argued as a general principle that a justice system cannot truly be impartial when
there are business entities betting on it.43 The most prominent and fervent critic of
the practice appears to be the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which, in 2009, called
for the prohibition of third-party litigation financing at all levels.44 The critics counter
the David-versus-Goliath analogy, arguing that David-like plaintiffs do not always
39 See Rodak, supra note 18, at 515 (“[L]itigation financing gives plaintiffs increased
leverage and bargaining power against typically large, wealthy defendant corporations with
seemingly unlimited resources and time.”).
40 Barksdale, supra note 38, at 734.
41 See, e.g., #1 Classic Litigation Funding, BURFORD CAP., http://www.burfordcapital
.com/casestudies/classic-litigation-funding/ (last visited Apr. 15, 2014) (explaining classic
funding scenarios in which claimants have valuable claims but lack funds to afford preferable
counsel or to prosecute the case).
42 See, e.g., Leader Techs., Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 373 (D. Del. 2010);
Mondis Tech., Ltd. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 2:07-cv-565, 2011 WL 1714304 (E.D. Tex. May 4,
2011); see also #1 Classic Litigation Funding, supra note 41.
43 See, e.g., Lisa Rickard, Why Are Hedge Funds Allowed to Invest in Litigation?,
ATLANTIC (July 3, 2012, 1:42 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/07
/why-are-hedge-funds-allowed-to-invest-in-litigation/259345/.
44 See Nate Raymond, More Attorneys Exploring Third-Party Litigation Funding, N.Y.
L.J. (June 4, 2010), available at http://litigationwealth.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/07
/More-attorneys-explore-third-party-litigation-financing.pdf.
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have meritorious cases and are not gaining access to greater “justice” with funding
from third-party litigation lenders.45 Instead, critics argue that third-party litigation
funding only increases the overall litigation volume, and these cases include the
gamut of frivolous claims.46 With an excess of these non-meritorious cases in the
judicial system, justice will not be effectively distributed.47 These general critiques
are without significant empirical evidence and ignore the economic realities facing
third-party litigation lenders. The argument that plaintiffs accepting third-party liti-
gation funding will be fueled to test non-meritorious cases in court ignores potential
economic common sense restrictions that third-party litigation lenders are unlikely
to ignore.48 Third-party litigation lenders are averse to risky claims which do not
have a high probability of success. Controlled by their fiduciary duties to their in-
ventors, third-party litigation lenders will be inclined to filter out these meritless
claims and pass on investing.
Another, more focused critique of the romantic vision of third-party ligation
financiers empowering plaintiffs to take on Goliath-like defendants is that in many
cases plaintiffs already hold the upper hand in bargaining power.49 Again, using
patent litigation as a vehicle to illustrate, “[t]he average patent infringement case
costs about $2 million to litigate.”50 Plaintiffs alleging that large corporate defen-
dants are infringing their patents at first glance seem to have quite the disadvantage.
However, empirical evidence shows that, on average, defendants bear the vast
majority of litigation costs due to the factors inherent in the nature of patent litiga-
tion. For instance, defendants have the burden of proving patent invalidity because
the patent-in-suit is valid, defendants risk preliminary injunctions against their
products, and defendants also risk treble damages and attorney’s fees if their patents
are found to infringe willfully.51 With all of these factors at play, the David-like
plaintiff suddenly has grown significantly in stature and the Goliath-like defendant,
with weakened bargaining power, has more incentive to settle regardless of the
merits. In patent litigation at least, particularly in the setting where companies
engage in the act of patent trolling—buying portfolios of patents with the sole in-
tention of litigating—third-party litigation, lenders have an opportunity to swoop in
45 John Beisner et al., Selling Lawsuits, Buying Trouble: Third-Party Litigation Funding
in the United States, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM 4 (Oct. 2009).
46 Id.
47 In To Kill A Mockingbird, Judge Taylor may agree with this notion. Without “cham-
pertous connivance” to throw out the frivolous case of quibbling between the Cunninghams
and the Coninghams, Judge Taylor’s docket may have been delayed, and Atticus may not
have been able to fight on behalf of Tom Robinson. See LEE, supra note 1, at 165.
48 See Lyon, supra note 29, at 593.
49 See Beisner et al., supra note 45, at 4 (calling into question who is a “Goliath-like
defendant”).
50 Joanna Shepherd Bailey et al., Third-Party Litigation Financing, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y
257, 264 (2011).
51 Id.
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and exploit the unequal bargaining positions between the litigation parties to make
a profit on their investment.52 Scholars have argued for regulation as a solution to
this problem, hoping to articulate rules which can continue to leverage the bargain-
ing power of these David-like plaintiffs, but simultaneously rein in abuses like the
above-mentioned situation.53
A very serious problem associated with third-party litigation financing is the
potential breach of ethical obligations by attorneys.54 When an investor invests in
a lawsuit, she will have a desire to protect her investment. At the outset, investors
will expend significant efforts evaluating litigation investment opportunities.55 In-
vestors, however, are generally barred from learning attorney-client privileged in-
formation by the rules of professional responsibility.56 Publicly traded third-party
litigation lenders that engage in lending to plaintiffs have a fiduciary duty to their
investors which conflicts with the duty of confidentiality that attorneys owe to their
clients.57 In an unregulated market of litigation financing, lenders will be able to
control the course and direction of the lawsuit by threatening or executing the
withdrawal of funding from clients at any stage of the litigation they wish. Ethics
opinions issued in Arizona, Florida, New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Utah, and
Virginia reflect the concerns that these states have regarding litigation financing.
According to these opinions, litigation financing violates fee-splitting prohibitions,
yet attorneys are permitted to provide litigation finance companies with information
about a client’s case when the client gives informed consent and may share informa-
tion about litigation financing with the client when doing so is in the client’s best
interest.58 One particular context where the ethical problems with third-party liti-
gation may be hard to maneuver around is the class-action lawsuit.59 While third-
party litigation finance can be an extremely helpful tool to realize a significant class
recovery which might otherwise fall flat, the contract fees, commissions, and other
52 Id.
53 States Need to Regulate Litigation Financing Industry: Professor, INS. J. (Jan. 11,
2012), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2012/01/11/230719.htm (quoting
Professor Maya Steinitz arguing that federal and state governments need to soon adopt laws
that regulate this growing market).
54 See, e.g., Beisner et al., supra note 45, at 7–8.
55 See Bailey et al., supra note 50, at 260 (“Third-party capital tries to identify good cases
in which [to] make an investment—similar to a portfolio manager identifying a good stock,
or a contingency fee lawyer deciding on which cases to invest his or her time.”).
56 See Douglas R. Richmond, Other People’s Money: The Ethics of Litigation Funding,
56 MERCER L. REV. 649, 669 (2005).
57 See Beisner et al., supra note 45, at 8–9 (discussing concern over third-party financiers
interfering with attorney-client relationships).
58 See Rodak, supra note 18, at 509 (citing Eileen Libby, Whose Lawsuit Is It?: Ethics
Opinions Express Mixed Attitudes About Litigation Funding Arrangements, A.B.A. J., May
2003, at 36 (providing an overview of how various state ethics committees have addressed
litigation financing)).
59 See Beisner et al., supra note 45, at 8–9.
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payments made to the financier may drastically reduce the amount of recovery for
the class.60 Further adding to the potential for abuse in the class action context, it is
practically impossible to consult with all members of the class before third-party
litigation finance agreements may be reached.61 Naturally, uninformed class mem-
bers may have a host of concerns when the case is ultimately disposed.
Another problem arises when sensitive case information is communicated to
third-party litigation finance companies for purposes of investment decision-making:
the waiver of attorney-client privilege for discoverability purposes. The general rule
in federal courts is that attorney-client privilege is waived upon disclosure of priv-
ileged material to a third party.62 However, the “common interest doctrine” is the
exception to that rule.63 In order to avoid potential waivers, litigating parties should
consider carefully which documents they want to disclose to potential investors—
specifically, limiting disclosure to only documents which are already expected to be
produced in litigation.64 Most importantly, prior to disclosing any documents to a
potential investor, litigating parties should already have executed confidentiality,
common interest, and non-disclosure agreements for evidentiary purposes and con-
fidentiality protection.65 The scope and boundaries of attorney-client privilege varies
across the circuits, and thus the ultimate issue of whether documents disclosed to
investors are discoverable will depend upon the location in which the suit is ulti-
mately filed.66
Along with the power of withdrawal of funding, lenders may also be able to
influence whether the cases are forced into court or into settlement.67 In one case in
North Carolina from 2001, a defendant’s law firm brought a tortuous interference
with contract claim, alleging that litigation-funding companies had interfered by
secretly lending $200,000 to his client.68 With its advance, the law firm claimed it
60 Kevin M. LaCroix, Has the “Litigation Funding Moment” Arrived?, D&O DIARY
(Feb. 4, 2013), http://www.dandodiary.com/2013/02/articles/securities-litigation/has-the
-litigation-funding-moment-arrived/.
61 See id.
62 See Beisner et al., supra note 45, at 8.
63 See, e.g., Leader Techs., Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (D. Del
2010) (“The common interest doctrine is an exception to the general rule that the attorney-
client privilege is waived following disclosure of privileged materials to a third party.”
(citing Union Carbide Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 1036, 1047 (D. Del. 1985))).
64 Lisa M. Thomas, Third-Party Litigation Funding: Are Communications with Investors
Discoverable?, BAKER BOTTS INTELL. PROP. REP. (Dec. 2012), http://www.bakerbotts.com
/file_upload/IPReport201212-Third-PartyLitigationFunding.htm.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 See Lisa Rickard, A Legal View from America, HUFFINGTON POST (July 20, 2012,
12:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/lisa-rickard/a-legal-view-from-america_b_16
85927.html.
68 See McLaughlin, supra note 16, at 641 (citing Weaver, Bennett & Bland v. Speedy
Bucks Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 448, 450 (W.D.N.C. 2001)).
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would be impossible for it to settle its client’s claim for less than $1,200,000 in
order to repay the debt of $600,000 after the lender’s collection of a fifty-percent
contingency fee.69 On the other side, the plaintiff’s law firm filed a counterclaim
alleging that the defendant had intentionally induced the plaintiff to refuse the
settlement offer and refuse the law firm attorney’s advice, thereby violating the
terms of the plaintiff’s law firm retainer agreement.70 While in this case, attorneys
did not break rules of professional responsibility by sharing confidential attorney-
client privileged information with third-party litigation lenders, the client broke free
from the reins of her attorney’s advice by acting in the interest of herself vis-à-vis
her return on a loan made by a third-party litigation lender.71 This is an example of
how a third-party litigation lender can potentially poison the attorney-client relation-
ship.72 This issue is one in which a state government may have a legitimate interest
in preventing, and specialized litigation regulations, as discussed infra, can still pre-
vent these transgressions without categorically prohibiting all third-party litigation
finance agreements.73
II. BARRIERS TO THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FINANCING
Two concepts that have existed in common law since medieval England and are
derived from ancient Greek and Roman law—maintenance and champerty—are the
two major legal barriers to the third-party litigation finance industry.74 Maintenance
is defined by Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary as “an officious or unlawful intermed-
dling in a legal suit by assisting either party with means to carry it on.”75 Champerty
is a particular type of maintenance, wherein the party providing maintenance seeks
to profit from the suit: It involves “[a]n agreement to divide litigation proceeds
between the owner of the litigated claim and a party unrelated to the lawsuit who
supports or helps enforce the claim.”76
The U.S. Supreme Court offers its own succinct definition of the doctrines: “Put
simply, maintenance is helping another prosecute a suit; champerty is maintaining
a suit in return for a financial interest in the outcome.”77 Champerty may also be
defined more pejoratively, as “an agreement between an officious intermeddler in
a lawsuit and a litigant by which the intermeddler helps pursue the litigant’s claim
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 See infra Conclusion.
74 See Ari Dobner, Note, Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1543–44 (1996).
75 Maintenance Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com
/dictionary/maintenance (last visited Apr. 15, 2014).
76 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 262 (9th ed. 2009).
77 Lyon, supra note 29, at 579 (citing In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 424–25 n.15 (1978)).
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as consideration for receiving part of any judgment proceeds.”78 In medieval times,
feudal lords subsidized their subjects’ litigations for profit, “underwrit[ing] suits
against their enemies as a form of private warfare to weaken their opponent’s
coffers.”79 Judge Blackstone, warning his counterparts of the evils of champerty,
wrote that the offense was “perverting the process of law into an engine of oppres-
sion.”80 While champerty is more correctly categorized as a specific type of mainte-
nance, courts have conflated these terms in modern practice.81
In the United States, thirty-three out of fifty states (and the District of Columbia)
have champerty laws that prohibit a third party from taking a financial interest in a
lawsuit.82 Many states have already thrown out their champerty statutes or simply
stopped enforcing them, following the lead of other countries relaxing their prohibi-
tions on champerty.83
In addition, several American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules may place
restrictions on the flexibility of third-party litigation lenders and their ability to mon-
itor effectively their investments and communicate with litigants.84 This Note is less
concerned with the Model Rules and the various states’ adoption of the rules be-
cause those rules contain provisions allowing for alternative litigation finance when
the client gives informed consent after receiving the full, candid disclosure of all the
associated risks and benefits, whereas champerty statutes may act as total bars to
third-party litigation finance. At least one scholar has already pointed out that ABA
78 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 262 (9th ed. 2009).
79 Lyon, supra note 29, at 581.
80 Thallhimer v. Brinckerhoff, 3 Cow. 623, 644 (N.Y. 1824) (citing 4 BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *135).
81 L.S. Tellier, Annotation, Assertion of Defense of Champerty in Action by Champertous
Assignee, 22 A.L.R.2d 1001–02 (1952).
82 See Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 107 & n.190
(2011) (stating that sixteen states, not including the District of Columbia, permit champerty
(maintenance for profit)).
83 New Jersey has never allowed champerty as a defense. See Weller v. Jersey City H.
& P. St. Ry. Co., 57 A. 730, 732 (N.J. Ch. 1904) (“[T]he law of maintenance and champerty
has never prevailed in this state . . . .”). In 1997, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
held that the Commonwealth would no longer void agreements as champertous. Saldini v.
Righellis, 687 N.E.2d 1224, 1226–27 (Mass. 1997). Florida has significantly modified and
South Carolina has abolished champerty as a permissible defense. See Kraft v. Mason, 668
So. 2d 679, 682–83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (requiring unwanted or unnecessary inter-
meddling as an element of champerty); Osprey, Inc. v. Cabana Ltd. P’ship, 532 S.E.2d 269,
277 (S.C. 2000).
84 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2013) [hereinafter MODEL RULE
1.7] (defining “conflict of interest” as including representation “materially limited” by at-
torney’s responsibilities to a third-party or the lawyer’s own interests); MODEL RULE 1.8(f)
(1)–(3) (stating that an attorney must not accept compensation for representation from a third
party without gaining informed consent of client and only if it will not interfere with at-
torney’s independent professional judgment).
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Model Rule 5.4, which provides that “[a] lawyer or law firm shall not share legal
fees with a nonlawyer” and “shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of
the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law,”85 may be unconstitu-
tional under Citizens United.86
A. Champerty Law in the United States
Scholars have argued, and many courts have agreed, that laws prohibiting
champerty are rooted in outdated, antiquated visions of the litigation system and
have no applicability to the modern courts.87 Traditional champerty common law
from medieval England “has eroded to near obsolescence,”88 but many states still
retain laws reflecting the general public policy goals of prohibiting profiteering
and litigation speculation.89 These policies codified by states “have not [been]
updated . . . in the commercial context in many years, [and] in some cases even a
century or more.”90 In this Part, champerty laws will be characterized and analyzed
for their potential chilling effect on third-party litigation lenders making investments
towards funding litigation. In some cases, courts have completely rejected cham-
perty laws and instead have substituted fairness considerations to review deals
between third-party litigation lenders and clients.91
B. Defining Champerty Law in New York
Third-party litigation finance companies seek out claims across the United
States, invoking both state and substantive law. In claims arising out of finance
agreements between investors and litigants, state courts will typically apply the law
85 MODEL RULE 5.4(a), (b).
86 See Renee Newman Knake, Democratizing the Delivery of Legal Services, 73 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1, 17 (2012) (stating that Model Rule 5.4 and others may not be able to “withstand
a First Amendment challenge” post–Citizens United).
87 See, e.g., Osprey, Inc., 532 S.E.2d at 277; Lyon, supra note 29, at 576 (“[C]ommon
law doctrines of maintenance and champerty are inconsistent with our contemporary view
of litigation.”).
88 Dobner, supra note 74, at 1529; see also Sebok, supra note 82, at 121–22 (discussing
how centuries of jurisprudence have resulted in a less than uniform view of champerty and
maintenance which existed in early England).
89 Dobner, supra note 74, at 1529 (quoting 14 AM. JUR. 2D Champerty & Maintenance
§ 1 (1964) (“In none of the states are the doctrines or laws of champerty and maintenance
preserved in their original rigor. In many states they are declared to be obsolete and to have
no existence at all.”)).
90 Bailey et al., supra note 50, at 262.
91 See, e.g., Bashor v. Northland Ins. Co., 480 P.2d 864, 867 (Colo. App. 1970) (rejecting
the idea of “intermeddling maintenance” and focusing instead on how much control the liti-
gation funder had over the litigation).
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of the state in which the agreement is to be performed, or in the alternative, the law
of the state which has the most significant ties to the litigating and lending parties.92
As most of the publicly traded third-party litigation finance companies are located
in and around New York,93 New York champerty law is highly relevant to the dis-
cussion. New York Judiciary Law Section 489(1) states in part that “no corporation
or association . . . shall solicit, buy or take an assignment of, or be in any manner
interested in buying or taking an assignment of . . . any claim or demand, with the
intent and for the purpose of bringing an action or proceeding thereon.”94 New York
courts have not yet made a clear statement of whether this statute prohibits third-party
litigation lenders from investing in cases for profit. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit interpreted Section 489 in the way that it predicted the New York
Court of Appeals would, but it was careful to note in Elliott Associates, L.P. v. Banco
de la Nacion95 that New York courts “have consistently interpreted [Section 489] as
proscribing something narrower than merely maintaining a suit in return for a finan-
cial interest in the outcome.”96 While the Second Circuit’s ruling was helpful to trace
the origins of New York champerty law and the rationale behind prohibition on
champerty, the facts of the Elliott Associates case necessarily limited the holding to
situations in which a debt instrument was acquired by a third party with the primary
purpose of enforcing it, and the litigation stemming from the enforcement of the
instrument did not violate Section 489.97
In 2010, the New York Court of Appeals came even closer to expounding upon
the applicability of Section 489 when it decided Merrill Lynch Mortgage v. Love
Funding Corp.,98 but it only held that a corporation or association that takes an
assignment of a claim does not violate New York Judiciary Law Section 489(1) if
its purpose is to collect damages, by means of a lawsuit, for losses on a debt instru-
ment in which it holds a preexisting proprietary interest.99 While this ruling assured
participants in the secondary distressed debt and bankruptcy claims market that rely
heavily on the notion that their procured assignments of distressed claims include
92 Lauren Deysher Gojkovich, Note, Leveraging Litigation: How Shareholders Can Use
Litigation Leverage to Double-Down on Their Investment in High-Stakes Securities Litiga-
tion, 16 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 100, 115 (2010).
93 See Raymond, supra note 44.
94 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 489 (McKinney 2004).
95 Elliott Assocs. v. Banco de la Nacion, 194 F.3d 363 (2d Cir. 1999).
96 Id. at 372 (internal quotation marks omitted).
97 See id. (“[T]he New York Court of Appeals . . . would rule that the acquisition of a
debt with intent to bring suit against the debtor is not a violation of the statute where, as here,
the primary purpose [is to collect the debt].”).
98 Trust for the Certificate Holders of Merrill Lynch Mortg. Investors, Inc. v. Love Fund-
ing Corp., 918 N.E.2d 889 (N.Y. 2009).
99 Id. at 894, 895. For a detailed summary of the facts and accompanying analysis of this
case, see Lazar Emanuel, Litigation Funding and the Law of Champerty, NYPRR, July 2010,
at 1–2, 4–5.
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their right to enforce the underlying obligation by bringing suit, the decision did not
explicitly mention the legality of third-party litigation finance agreements which
may run afoul of Section 489.100 Indications in the language of the decision, al-
though ambiguous, give rise to an inference that the New York Court of Appeals is
likely to support a third-party litigation finance agreement involving a financing
party in the business of funding lawsuits, assuming that the lender is truly in the
business of litigation funding, with its express purpose being to make a profit rather
than to bring lawsuits into the court.101
Third-party litigation lenders still have unanswered questions in New York’s
champerty jurisprudence, including, “[i]s litigation funding by a source which is not
a party to litigation legal?”102 In the face of this looming question, Section 489’s
uncertain prohibitions on champerty still pose a threat to the booming litigation
finance industry, much of which is housed in New York. Therefore, in light of the
categorical prohibitory language of Section 489, which may prohibit third-party
litigation finance agreements without narrow tailoring to protect the legitimate
government concerns with litigation financing agreements, New York champerty
law is still subject to First Amendment analysis, as will be discussed infra.103
100 See Emanuel, supra note 99, at 5 (discussing lingering questions following the ruling).
101 Indeed, an earlier opinion in the case of Echeverria v. Estate of Linder, No. 018666/
2002, 2005 WL 1083704 (N.Y. Sup. Mar. 2, 2005), helps to affirm this inference:
Under New York law these assignments are allowed as long as the
primary purpose and intent of the assignment was for some reason
other than bringing suit on that assignment. . . . [U]nder New York law
the primary purpose and intent of taking the assignment would be to
profit, and not to bring suit, which would prevent this action from being
Champerty. Resting on the language of Judiciary Law 489, and the pur-
pose and intent requirement, the Court is comfortable finding that the
instant agreement is not champerty.
Id. at *7.
102 See Emanuel, supra note 99, at 7. Emanuel lists six additional more focused questions
that the New York Court will need to resolve:
1.) Is litigation funding that provides a return to the source of funding
in excess of the legal usury rate lawful and/or proper? 2.) Is usury an
element in champerty? 3.) Recognizing that some plaintiffs (e.g., plain-
tiffs with claims for personal injury or for malpractice) may not have
the funds to recover on their claims, shall we authorize litigation fund-
ing only in specified causes of action? 4.) In the funding of litigation,
is there a difference between loans to litigants with a specified interest
rate and the purchase of a contingent interest in the recovery or settle-
ment of the litigation? 5.) If the source of the litigation funding pur-
chases a contingent interest, is that interest limited to a specified portion
of the lawyer’s contingent fee, or can it extend to a specified portion of
the client’s recovery? 6.) What is the proper relationship between the
lawyer for a litigant and a potential source of litigation funding?
Id.
103 See infra Part III.
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C. Defining Champerty Law in Ohio: Rancman v. Interim Settlement
Funding Corp. and Legislative Action
Ohio, through legislative action, has updated its law, effectively abrogating the
Ohio Supreme Court, to reflect a modern and matured understanding of the cham-
perty doctrine.104 In Rancman v. Interim Settlement Corp.,105 the Supreme Court of
Ohio interpreted the continued validity of champerty in the state.106 The plaintiff in
Rancman received a $7,000 advance on any future settlement of a claim pending
against her insurance company for injuries sustained in a car accident.107 The fund-
ing agreement provided for a graduated rate of return based on the length of time
until her suit was resolved: $19,600 if the case closed within one year of the loan,
$24,800 if the resolution happened between twelve and eighteen months, and so
on.108 After she settled her suit for $100,000 in under twelve months, Rancman
sought rescission of the advance agreement on the grounds that it was a usurious loan,
or one offered at an illegally high interest rate.109 The defendant, Interim Settlement
Funding Corporation, countered that the agreement constituted an investment, not
a loan, and therefore was not subject to statutory limitations on interest rates under
usury law.110 Lower trial- and appellate-level Ohio courts found that the contract was
void under Ohio usury law because the potential profit on the money advances ex-
ceeded the legally permissible interest rate.111 However, the Ohio Supreme Court
ruled that “[i]t [was] unnecessary for the resolution of [the] case to determine the
threshold level of risk necessary for a contingent advance to be treated as an invest-
ment rather than a loan” because the relevant inquiry was whether the advances were
void as champerty.112
The court delved into the history and policy of maintenance and champerty law
in Ohio, stating, “The doctrines of champerty and maintenance were developed at
common law to prevent officious intermeddlers from stirring up strife and conten-
tion by vexatious and speculative litigation which would disturb the peace of society,
104 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (West 2008) (allowing “non-recourse civil liti-
gation advance[s],” provided there is compliance with certain requirements).
105 789 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 2003).
106 Id. at 218.
107 Id. at 218–19.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 219. The common-law concept of usury factors heavily into the validity of a third-
party litigation financing agreement. For an analysis of the impact of usury laws on the liti-
gation finance industry, see John P. Barylick & Jenna Wims Hashway, Litigation Financing:
Preying on Plaintiffs, 59 R.I. B.J. 5, 37–39 (2011) (describing how litigation finance com-
panies intentionally draft contracts so as to avoid state usury laws).
110 Rancman, 789 N.E.2d at 219.
111 Id.
112 Id.
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lead to corrupt practices, and prevent the remedial process of the law.”113 Ultimately,
the Ohio Supreme Court held that champerty and maintenance were still enforceable
under Ohio law and thus the transactions at issue were null and void because they
violated the Ohio champerty law.114 Specifically, the court held that “a contract
making the repayment of funds advanced to a party in a pending case contingent
upon the outcome of that case is void as [champertous].”115 The court reasoned that
the act “constitute[d] champerty because it gives a [third party] an impermissible in-
terest in a suit, [it] impedes the settlement of the underlying case, and it promotes spec-
ulation in lawsuits.”116 The Rancman court was concerned with the “champertor’s
earning a handsome profit by speculating in a lawsuit and by potentially manipulat-
ing a party to the suit.”117 Many scholars criticized the Rancman court’s narrow view
of third-party litigation finance.118 Most troubling with the Rancman decision was
the paternalistic view that the court took in protecting litigants, a view which directly
conflicts with earlier Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding state restrictions on the
delivery of speech.119
Five years later, the Ohio legislature overturned Rancman and the State’s cham-
perty laws and set out a statute defining the limits and bounds of third-party litiga-
tion financing, or under the statute, “non-recourse civil litigation advance[s].”120
Ohio’s statute provides a lightly regulated, yet admirable model for controlling the
potential dangers of third-party litigation finance without infringing upon First
Amendment rights.121 The statute sets out requirements for the finance contract,
defines parties who may be involved in this transaction, and sets forth attorney
responsibilities that comply with the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct.122 The
statute does not address the “handsome profit” that the third-party litigation funder
may reap; however, it does prohibit “third-party [litigation] lenders from making
any legal decisions regarding the underlying civil action.”123
113 Id. at 219–20 (quoting 14 C.J.S. Champerty and Maintenance § 3 (1991) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)).
114 Id. at 220–21.
115 Id. at 221.
116 Id.
117 Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
118 See, e.g., Stephen Gillers, Waiting for Good Dough: Litigation Funding Comes to Law,
43 AKRON L. REV. 677, 678 (2010) (characterizing the decision as “myopic, hostile, and su-
perficial”); Sebok, supra note 82, at 112 (“[T]he argument for limiting profit maintenance
based on the claim that any ex ante increase in the settlement value of a case always converts
the investment into a form of intermeddling profit maintenance is wrong.”).
119 See infra Part III.B.
120 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (West 2013).
121 See id. (requiring, among other things, the fee advancement contract disclose the total
dollar amount to be repaid by the consumer, and that the consumer have the option to cancel
withing a few days of fund disbursement).
122 See id.
123 Lyon, supra note 29, at 586–87.
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D. States that Prohibit Champerty
As of 2011, sixteen states expressly permit champerty, leaving thirty-five which
may not.124 Generally, states that outlaw champerty by statute do so in several dif-
ferent forms, and all of the states that prohibit champerty do so in broad terms.125 The
primary objective of states prohibiting champerty is to prohibit “intermeddling profit
maintenance,” which, as Professor Anthony Sebok has described, “can take many
forms.”126 He argues that intermeddling profit maintenance is limited, and requires
“that the investigator has bought the right to make certain decisions about the liti-
gation [taking away the right] from the party bringing the suit along with a share of
the contingent outcome.”127
A survey of prohibitory champerty law in the states begins with Virginia. In Vir-
ginia, “barratry” is a criminal offense punishable by a fine not more than $10,000;
however, barratry is vaguely defined by statute as “the offense of stirring up litiga-
tion,” where “‘stirring up litigation’ means instigating or attempting to instigate a
person or persons to institute a [lawsuit].”128 Unlike other state statutes, such as
Florida’s, which takes into account whether a third party holds too much control
over a lawsuit by defining intermeddling as “offering unnecessary and unwanted ad-
vice or services; meddlesome, esp[ecially] in a highhanded or overbearing way,”129
the Virginia statute prohibits any conduct by a third party in a lawsuit insofar as that
124 See Sebok, supra note 82, at 107 & n.190 (citing the sixteen states with their respective
corresponding cases and statutes). In this Part, I am specifically referring to states that ban
maintenance for profit or maintenance in which a third party can collect on a percentage of
winnings in a lawsuit.
125 See id.
126 Id. at 98–120.
127 See id. at 109.
128 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-451, 452 (West 1975). As a direct response to the Button deci-
sion, the Virginia legislature included a provision in the statute that does not prohibit cham-
perty when the instigating of a lawsuit is “justified.” See supra note 9 and accompanying
text. Per Section (e), “justified” may include when
the instigator is acting on behalf of a duly constituted legal aid society
approved by the Virginia State Bar which offers advice or assistance
in all kinds of legal matters to all members of the public who come to
it for advice or assistance and are unable because of poverty to pay
legal fees.
§ 18.2-451(e).
129 Sebok, supra note 82, at 109 (citing Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1996)); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 877.01(i) (West 2012) (“Whoever gives, promises,
offers or conspires to give, promise, or offer, to anyone any bribe, money, goods, presents,
reward, or any valuable thing whatsoever with the intent and purpose of stirring up strife and
litigation; or with intent and purpose of assisting, seeking out, influencing, or advising the
accused, sick, injured, uninformed, or others to bring suit or seek professional legal services
or advice, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .”).
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party is not already excluded by the provisions outlining the definition of cham-
perty.130 Indeed, Virginia law does carve out a small exception which may explicitly
provide a way for a third-party litigation finance company to finagle around the
barratry statute in very limited circumstances:
Only those causes of action for damage to real or personal prop-
erty, whether such damage be direct or indirect, and causes of
action ex contractu are assignable. The provisions of this section
shall not prohibit any injured party or his estate from making a
voluntary assignment of the proceeds or anticipated proceeds of
any court award or settlement as security for new value given in
consideration of such voluntary assignment.131
The relatively limited exception of “damage to real or personal property” and
“causes of action ex contractu” would not account for a variety of claims which
third-party litigation funders might choose to finance, such as business tort claims,
defamation claims, claims of invasion of privacy and so on.132
Other states, such as Alabama, ban champerty from the attorney’s perspective.133
Alabama’s statute bans a variety of attorney conduct that is aimed at attorneys who
solicit funding from third parties for their clients with the purpose of advancing their
claims and procuring profit for themselves.134 These statutes, which are aimed at
limiting attorneys from engaging in champertous agreements, directly channel the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding attorney solicitation for pecuniary gain,
discussed infra.135 But the champertous conduct prohibited by these statutes would
effectively prohibit attorneys from soliciting finance agreements from third-party
litigation financiers for their clients.
The defense of champerty has also existed at common law and continues to exist
even without reference to statutory provisions. Several states have reaffirmed the
130 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-451 (West 1975).
131 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-26 (West 1991).
132 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 34-28.1 (West 2003) (stating that unless permitted by Sec-
tion 8.01-26, awards and settlements in personal injury cases are exempt from creditors);
Cmty. Hosp. of Roanoke Valley, Inc. v. Musser (In re Musser), 24 B.R. 913, 922 (Bankr. W.D.
Va. 1982) (stating “that the prohibition against assignments of causes of action for personal
injury does not [prevent] a hospital from obtaining equitable assignment” for medical bills).
133 ALA. CODE § 34-3-24 (2014).
134 Id. (“Any attorney-at-law, either before or after action brought, who gives, offers or prom-
ises to give a valuable consideration to another person as an inducement to placing in the hands
of such attorney or in the hands of any partnership of attorneys, or in the hands of any other
attorney, a demand of any kind for the purpose of bringing an action or making claim against
another person, corporation or partnership . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .”).
135 See infra notes 150–65 and accompanying text; see also infra text accompanying note
184.
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defense of champerty at common law.136 These states, including Pennsylvania and
Minnesota, have refused to abandon the doctrine even in the wake of other states
abolishing champerty.137 Indeed, they appear to be the dwindling minority, and their
state’s courts rely on each other’s upholding of the doctrine as their primary ratio-
nale for continuing the doctrine.138
Some states may be less concerned with issues of control but more with the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce theory that champerty may bring more frivolous lawsuits
that would not have otherwise existed.139 For example, wary of this problem,
Colorado has developed a sweeping definition of intermeddling that potentially
envelops a large number of litigation finance contracts into the territory of illegality.
The Eighth Circuit summarized a series of Colorado opinions to stand for the prop-
osition that “intermeddling” meant encouraging or causing another to bring a suit
“which otherwise he would not have brought.”140 This broad definition, which
comes from a case in 1902, has never been overruled and has not been updated to
comport with more modern views of the litigation system and mature applications
of champerty doctrine.
III. INVESTING IN LITIGATION: FREE SPEECH?
A. Marching Toward Litigation as Protected Free Speech
Before Citizens United, the Supreme Court began its protection of political
speech by entities in the early 1960s against the backdrop of the Civil Rights
movement. In 1963, the Court decided NAACP v. Button,141 which found that the
activity of the NAACP’s lawyers—solicitation of clients to bring civil discrimina-
tion lawsuits—was protected by the First Amendment.142 The decision struck down
several Virginia statutes on champerty, barratry, and maintenance as unconstitu-
tional in that they chilled First Amendment interests of asserting political speech.143
Those statutes went as far as making it a crime for a lawyer merely to tell another
individual that their rights have been violated or refer that person to an attorney or
136 See, e.g., Lingel v. Olbin, 8 P.3d 1163, 1173 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000); Johnson v. Wright,
682 N.W.2d 671, 680 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004); Frank v. TeWinkle, 45 A.3d 434, 439 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2012), appeal denied, 56 A.3d 398 (Pa. 2012).
137 See, e.g., Johnson, 682 N.W.2d at 679–80.
138 See, e.g., id. at 680 (“As an error correcting court, we do not presume to abandon the
champerty doctrine simply because a few states have chosen to do so.”).
139 See Sebok, supra note 82, at 113.
140 Id. at 113–14 (citing Casserleigh v. Wood, 119 F. 308, 312 (8th Cir. 1902)).
141 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
142 Id. at 428–29, 432, 437.
143 Id. at 437.
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group of attorneys.144 In his opinion, Justice Brennan delivered these words, care-
fully defining litigation that was to be protected by the First Amendment:
Resort to the courts to seek vindication of constitutional rights
is a different matter from the oppressive, malicious, or avari-
cious use of the legal process for purely private gain. Lawsuits
attacking racial discrimination, at least in Virginia, are neither
very profitable nor very popular. They are not an object of gen-
eral competition among Virginia lawyers; the problem is rather
one of an apparent dearth of lawyers who are willing to under-
take such litigation.145
Here, there was careful effort by the Court to distinguish lawsuits brought purely for
profit and private gain from lawsuits brought to seek “vindication of constitutional
rights.”146 In explaining why the efforts by the NAACP lawyers to act in the face of
Virginia statutes criminalizing the solicitation of prospective litigants, Justice
Brennan emphasized that the NAACP lawyers must have derived personal satisfac-
tion in participation in litigation because the lawyers “would hardly be inclined to
participate at the risk of financial sacrifice.”147 This line of reasoning promoting First
Amendment protection to litigation as political expression extended to a number of
cases several years later dealing with attorneys advertising to and solicitation of poten-
tial clients for legal representation.148 Professor Sebok has argued that this decision
prevents states from limiting the power of laypersons to engage in “selfless mainte-
nance” designed to protect constitutionally protected rights through litigation.149
Fifteen years later, the Court continued to emphasize the distinction between
lawsuits for pecuniary gain and lawsuits for political expression when it decided two
cases in the same day: In re Primus and Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association. In
the former case, a South Carolina attorney associated with the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), who had solicited for legal representation women who
were sterilized as part of the State’s law that conditioned some welfare assistance
on sterilization, was reprimanded by the South Carolina Bar Association for violat-
ing bar rules prohibiting attorneys from soliciting business.150 Despite the potential
for the ACLU to benefit financially in the event of a successful litigation, the Su-
preme Court overturned the disciplinary decision, holding that the action of the
144 Id. at 434.
145 Id. at 443 (footnote omitted).
146 Id.
147 Id. at 444.
148 See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412 (1978).
149 Sebok, supra note 82, at 101.
150 In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 415–19.
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attorney constituted pursuing litigation as a vehicle for effective political expression
and association, an action protected by the First Amendment.151 In Ohralik, an
attorney was disciplined by the Ohio State Bar Association for his personal solici-
tation of accident victims for the purpose of representing them on a contingent-fee
basis.152 Unlike in Primus, the Court found that the State could constitutionally
discipline a lawyer for soliciting clients for pecuniary gain because the First Amend-
ment only marginally concerned the attorney’s conduct, and the State did not lose
its right to regulate commercial activity deemed harmful to the public even if speech
is a component of that activity.153
Once again in Ohralik, the Supreme Court was careful to distinguish litigation
as a form of political expression from litigation solely for private pecuniary gain.154
However, as will be discussed infra, the decision in Ohralik further elaborated on
the protection of commercial speech under the First Amendment.155 Additionally,
the Court was careful to focus its concern on a state bar association’s right to impose
sanctions on an attorney whose in-person solicitation for pecuniary gain created a
great threat to the protected interests of litigants.156 This interest, the Court empha-
sized, was to protect potential litigants from being unduly pressured by attorneys
into making speedy and uninformed legal decisions.157
In re Primus and Ohralik both emphasized that a lawyer is not be protected
under the First Amendment for soliciting and promoting litigation for his own pecu-
niary gain.158 While both cases involved attorneys soliciting clients for representa-
tion with the potential for pecuniary gain, the key difference between the two was
that the attorney in Primus worked for an organization that regularly engaged in
litigation as a form of political expression: the ACLU.159 Because the attorney re-
ceived a salary not directly from the ACLU, but rather from an externally associated
nonprofit organization associated with the ACLU,160 the Court did not deem this to
be sufficient to categorize the litigation outside of the realm of political speech.161
151 Id. at 439.
152 Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449–53.
153 Id. at 459.
154 See id. at 464 (“The Rules were applied in this case to discipline a lawyer for soliciting
employment for pecuniary gain under circumstances likely to result in the adverse conse-
quences the State seeks to avert. In such a situation, which is inherently conducive to over-
reaching and other forms of misconduct, the State has a strong interest in adopting and
enforcing rules of conduct designed to protect the public from harmful solicitation by law-
yers whom it has licensed.”).
155 See infra Part III.B.
156 See Lyon, supra note 29, at 589 (discussing Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457).
157 Id.
158 See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457–59, 462–68; In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 433, 434 (1978).
159 In re Primus, 436 U.S. at 414–15.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 428–29.
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The Court explicitly rejected an argument that “the ACLU’s policy of requesting an
award of counsel fees [took the] case outside of the protection of Button.”162 Despite
the fact that the ACLU could seek pecuniary gain from having its individual attor-
neys solicit clients, the Court embraced the ACLU’s overall inclination toward liti-
gation for its political purposes.163
Most important for later application in an analysis of the constitutionality of
champerty law, the Primus Court rejected South Carolina’s defense grounded in its
interest to prevent “the ‘stirring up’ of frivolous or vexatious litigation and minimiz-
ing commercialization of the legal profession.”164 Using the same reasoning from
Button, the “Court declined to accept the proffered analogy to the common-law of-
fenses of maintenance, champerty, and barratry, where the record would not support
a finding that the litigant was solicited for a malicious purpose or ‘for private gain,
serving no public interest . . . .’”165 As will be argued infra,166 champerty statutes
which categorically prohibit third-party litigation financiers from investing in
litigants for the purpose of litigation must be defended on their ability to prevent
litigants from being solicited for private gain, and this defense is likely no longer
constitutionally valid after Citizens United.
B. Champerty Prohibition as Commercial Speech Regulation
Can absolutely prohibitory champerty laws fall into the categorization of com-
mercial speech restricting regulation? Perhaps. In 1976, two years before the Ohralik
decision, the Supreme Court first recognized that some commercial speech was pro-
tected under the First Amendment.167 In Virginia State Pharmacy Board v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,168 consumers of prescription drugs brought suit
against the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and its individual members, challenging
the validity of a Virginia statute declaring it unprofessional conduct for a licensed
pharmacist to advertise the prices of prescription drugs.169 The “commercial speech”
at issue was categorized as advertising, which can be distinguished from the in-person
solicitation at issue in Button, Primus, and Ohralik. Writing for the Court, Justice
Blackmun held that “commercial speech” was not wholly outside the protection of
162 Id. at 429.
163 See id. at 429–31 (noting that the mere ability of the ACLU to seek an award of
counsel fees is insufficient to move the organization’s action outside the realm of the First
Amendment protection).
164 Id. at 436–37.
165 Id. at 437 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 440 (1963)).
166 See infra Part IV.
167 Nat Stern, In Defense of the Imprecise Definition of Commercial Speech, 58 MD. L.
REV. 55, 56 (1999).
168 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
169 Id. at 749–50.
1316 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 22:1293
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.170 The Court noted that price information was
very important to the consumers, and it intimated that the First Amendment pro-
tected the “right to ‘receive information’” in addition to the right to speak.171 Here,
the Court emphasized the difference between the rights of the speaker and the rights
of the listener.172 Given the free speech interests at stake, the Court said that the state
regulation must support a substantial interest.173 However, the Court was ruling
against statutes constraining advertising by commercial entities, rather than the in-
person solicitation of clients, as was taking place in Button, Primus, and Ohralik.
Elaborating on the definition and protection of commercial speech two years later
in Ohralik, Justice Brennan stated:
We have not discarded the “common-sense” distinction between
speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an
area traditionally subject to government regulation, and other
varieties of speech. To require a parity of constitutional protec-
tion for commercial and noncommercial speech alike could in-
vite dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the
Amendment’s guarantee with respect to the latter kind of speech.
Rather than subject the First Amendment to such a devitaliza-
tion, we instead have afforded commercial speech a limited
measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate posi-
tion in the scale of First Amendment values, while allowing
modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm
of noncommercial expression.174
Since Virginia Pharmacy Board and Ohralik, the Supreme Court has heard more
than two dozen commercial-speech cases and has yet to create a clear-cut definition
of what amounts to commercial speech, thus leaving courts and scholars mystified
as to what expression receives commercial speech’s “limited measure of protec-
tion.”175 However after Virginia Pharmacy Board, the door was opened for constitu-
tional challenges to state and local rules that restricted general business advertising
and solicitation.176
170 Id. at 762.
171 Id. at 757 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762–63 (1972)).
172 See id.
173 See id. at 766–70 (assessing the state’s interest in the advertising ban).
174 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978) (emphasis added) (cita-
tion omitted).
175 Stern, supra note 167, at 56 (footnote omitted).
176 See David McGowan, Lawspeech, 21 J. PROF. LAW. 1, 9 (2012) (“[W]hen the Court
extended constitutional protection to commercial speech in the Virginia Pharmacy Board
case these [solicitation] restrictions became vulnerable to constitutional challenge.”).
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The Virginia Pharmacy Board decision effectively established a different level
of scrutiny for content-neutral regulations as opposed to content-based regulations.
A content-based regulation of protected speech is presumptively unconstitutional.177
To save such a statute, the government must show that the regulation is narrowly
drawn and necessary (narrowly tailored) to achieve a compelling government in-
terest.178 Application of this standard will almost invariably lead to invalidating the law
in question. However, in Virginia Pharmacy Board, the Court ruled that content-
neutral restrictions will not be found unconstitutional “provided that they are jus-
tified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a
significant governmental interest, and that in so doing they leave open ample alter-
native channels for communication of the information.”179
Four years after the Virginia Pharmacy Board decision, in Central Hudson Gas
& Electric v. Public Service Commission,180 the Court created a four-part test to
determine if commercial speech laws were unconstitutional in the face of the First
Amendment.181 The four-part test inquires as to whether 1) the regulated speech is
lawful and not misleading; 2) the government’s interest in restricting the speech is
substantial; 3) the regulation directly advances the government’s interest; and 4) the
regulation is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.182 Central
Hudson also explicitly noted that the Constitution “accords a lesser protection to
commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.”183 While
the first three elements may be satisfied by statutes prohibiting third-party litigation
under the veil of champerty, the Central Hudson test as applied may clash with
champerty statutes and their lack of narrow tailoring.184 The Central Hudson test,
however, allows for the government to defend a speech regulation without asserting
a compelling interest, which is required under the traditional test that is applied to
content-based speech restrictions.185
In elaborating on the protection of commercial speech, the Ohralik decision
helped to clarify commercial speech as it applied to in-person solicitation. Ohralik
177 See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 115 (1991) (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991)).
178 Id. at 118 (citing Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987)).
179 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1996).
180 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
181 Id. at 561–66.
182 Id. at 566.
183 Id. at 563 (citation omitted).
184 See id. at 565 (“The regulatory technique may extend only as far as the interests it serves.
The State cannot regulate speech that poses no danger to the asserted state interest, nor can
it completely suppress information when narrower restrictions on expression would serve its
interest as well.” (citations omitted)).
185 See id. at 566 (noting that the government must only offer a substantial interest when
limiting commercial speech).
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generally held that states may regulate in-person solicitation more stringently than
simple advertising.186 While the categorical prohibition of taking an interest in a
lawsuit for profit is arguably not an advertising restriction, the rationale behind
applying the Central Hudson test to champerty laws still may apply. Because cham-
perty laws prohibit a third party from engaging in taking a pecuniary interest in a
lawsuit, by extension, they must ban the third party from solicitation of litigants to
finance. Champerty statutes, depending on how they are constructed, may be
content-based. As stated earlier, Alabama’s champerty statute is written specifically
to ban conduct by attorneys.187 As attorneys’ speech—for example, soliciting fund-
ing from third parties for their clients with the purpose of advancing their claims and
procuring profit for themselves—is prohibited, testing this law may fall within the
purview of the content-based First Amendment strict scrutiny test. General prohibi-
tory champerty statutes, those which categorically ban all third parties from taking
an interest in a lawsuit, may be more likely to fall within the less rigorous commer-
cial speech test, because the prohibition of one specific type of activity by any party,
regardless of its entity status, is more like a content-neutral restriction. However, the
question of the distinction between commercial speech and non-commercial speech
becomes obfuscated when the party’s identity as a commercial entity is immaterial,
as it was in Citizens United.
C. Is Litigation Protected by the First Amendment?
To cabin investment in litigation by corporations within the Supreme Court’s
Citizens United opinion protecting corporate political expenditures, litigation must
be effectively construed as analogous to the same type of political speech the Court
is looking to protect. To protect the right to litigate under the First Amendment, the
question must be framed as a matter of access to the courts. Before a third-party liti-
gation financier is introduced, the First Amendment has to protect the base speech—
actually bringing a claim to court. The Supreme Court has ruled that “the right
of access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the
Government for redress of grievances.”188 As such, this right,
“cannot be impaired, either directly . . . or indirectly, by threat-
ening or harassing an [individual] in retaliation for filing law-
suits . . . .” The [courts] . . . make it clear that state officials may
not take retaliatory action against an individual designed either
to punish him for having exercised his constitutional right to
186 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 454–55 (1978).
187 See ALA. CODE § 34-3-24 (2014); supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text.
188 Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983).
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seek judicial relief or to intimidate or chill his exercise of that
right in the future.189
If the right of access to the courts is the framework for claiming First Amendment
protection, the First Amendment by no means allows for carte blanche freedom of
speech once access to the courts has been granted. As David McGowan accurately
asserted in his 2012 Professional Lawyer article, litigation is generally “freely
regulated with very little free speech protection.”190 In civil cases, where a plaintiff
is looking to assert or enforce some legal right which he in good faith believes has
been violated, resort to the courts to resolve the dispute is undeniably political. But
even in the most undeniably political cases, however, litigation is certainly not
subject to full free speech protection.191 Inasmuch as the Button, In re Primus, and
Ohralik line of cases demands that litigation is protected by the First Amendment
because it attempts to assert a legal right, litigation is still subject to the restrictions
generated by state and federal judicial rules that constrain speech to meet systemic
needs.192 However, at the heart of what litigation really concerns may be a form of
petitioning protected by the First Amendment.193
But, as Jason Lyon has pointed out, “the underlying rationale of [Button, In re
Primus, and Ohralik] was about protecting litigants from ‘vexatious conduct,’
whether it be attorney manipulation or ‘the oppressive, malicious, or avaricious use
of the legal process.’”194 The third-party litigation financier is not petitioning the
government to hear its claim and in all likelihood has little to no political alignment
of interests with its fundee-litigant. The large, publicly traded third-party litigation
funder, such as Burford or Juridica, is operating to make returns for its investors and
has not sponsored nor endorsed the merits of its fundee’s claim. Rather, it has made
a calculated decision that its fundee’s claim has an investment-worthy chance of suc-
ceeding. Nonetheless, the third-party litigation finance company has made a decision
to associate with the fundee-litigant whose rights to litigate are undeniably protected.
Furthermore, it is at least arguable that increasing access to federal and state
courts resulting from liberalized pleading standards coupled with ballooning liti-
gation costs arising from complex pretrial discovery may support the notion that
189 Glenview Constr., Inc. v. Bucci, 165 F. Supp. 2d 545, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting
Harrison v. Springdale Water & Sewer Comm’n, 780 F.2d 1422, 1428 (8th Cir. 1986)).
190 McGowan, supra note 176, at 12.
191 See id. (discussing Seattle Times Co. v. Rinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984), where the Court
held that the First Amendment does not provide a right to information in litigation).
192 See id. at 1–2 (“The need for courts to manage litigation and thus to restrict expression
that threatens to interfere with such management is seen to justify orders that would be plainly
unconstitutional in different settings.”).
193 See id. at 13–14 (discussing various forms of litigation as petitioning under the First
Amendment).
194 Lyon, supra note 29, at 589 (footnotes omitted); see also McGowan, supra note 176,
at 11 (discussing Button, Ohralik, and In re Primus).
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third-party litigation funding is actually a public service.195 Particularly in the David-
versus-Goliath model,196 where the plaintiff may have valid civil claims against a
larger company, a third-party litigation finance company may be the only viable
option for a plaintiff to proceed in protecting his or her own legal rights. In this
framework, there is no doubt that the denial of access to justice to potential plaintiffs
because they do not have the same bargaining power as Goliath-like defendants in
litigation equates these access-providers—third-party litigation funders—as public
service providers. When the protected First Amendment right, “the right of access
to the courts,”197 hinges upon the capital provided by third-party litigation finance,
then the access to the capital must be protected as well.
IV. CITIZENS UNITED BLURS THE BORDERS OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH
In 2010, the Supreme Court handed down a decision in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission,198 in which Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote an
opinion that some have argued completely rewrote the rules on campaign-finance
law in the United States.199 While the facts of Citizens United were very different in
nature from third-party litigation finance, the tenets and reasoning of the opinion
included language that broadly applied First Amendment protection to corporations.
The Court applied strict scrutiny on political speech grounds to strike down the 2002
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act provision that restricted independent political
expenditures by corporations and unions.200 In his five to four majority opinion,
Justice Kennedy wrote the “[g]overnment may not suppress political speech on the
195 Lyon, supra note 29, at 589.
196 Id. at 599 (citing Beisner et al., supra note 45, at 4).
197 Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983).
198 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
199 See, e.g., Harold Anthony Lloyd, A Right but Wrong Place: Righting and Rewriting
Citizens United, 56 S.D. L. REV. 219, 220–21 (2011) (discussing the effects of Citizens United);
Robert Sprague & Mary Ellen Wells, The Supreme Court as Prometheus: Breathing Life into
the Corporate Supercitizen, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 507, 507 (2012) (discussing the dramatic change
in view of corporations from the traditional views in Citizens United). Indeed, Citizens United
was and continues to be a highly controversial decision which many have criticized. This
Note deviates from the controversy and does not endorse the often-criticized tenets of the
Court’s reasoning. Perhaps Justice Stevens said it best in his dissent, taunting: “Under the
majority’s view, I suppose it may be a First Amendment problem that corporations are not
permitted to vote, given that voting is, among other things, a form of speech.” Citizens United,
130 S. Ct. at 948 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
200 130 S. Ct. at 887, 898–99, 913, 917 (majority opinion). Section 203 of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 prohibited corporations and unions from spending their gen-
eral treasury funds on “electioneering communications” or for speech that expressly advo-
cates the election or defeat of a candidate. Id. at 887.
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basis of the speaker’s corporate identity. No sufficient governmental interest jus-
tifies limits on the political speech of for-profit corporations.”201
Several scholars have already suggested that the ruling in Citizens United sets
up a foundation for the assertion that there is a First Amendment protected interest
in commercial activity as it is intrinsically bound with free speech and free associa-
tion.202 The reasoning in the suggestion follows by first eviscerating the distinction
between political speech and commercial speech.203 Continuing the progeny of
Button, the Court remarked that “political speech must prevail against laws that
would suppress it by design or inadvertence.”204 By “design” or by “inadvertence”—
here there can be no doubt that under the antiquated rationale which champerty law
first arose, the chilling consequences to third-party litigation finance companies are
certainly unintended. Kennedy was careful to state, “[w]e find no basis for the
proposition that, in the context of political speech, the Government may impose
restrictions on certain disfavored speakers. Both history and logic lead us to this
conclusion.”205 In the absence of a distinction which favors independent speakers
over corporate and commercial speakers, the line of reasoning in Button, Ohralik,
and In re Primus which prohibits taking an interest in litigation for pecuniary gain
becomes immaterial. A corporate entity making efforts to invest in, or even help to
bring a claim in court, is no different than an individual making the same efforts,
and the Government may not impose restrictions that suppress either.206
201 Id. at 913.
202 Lyon, supra note 29, at 589; see also Knake, supra note 86, at 33–37 (discussing
Citizens United’s effect on prior decisions related to free speech and economic competition);
Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Impact of Third-Party Financing on Transnational Liti-
gation, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 159, 166 (2011) (discussing First Amendment protection
for lawsuit funding).
203 See, e.g., Tamara R. Piety, Commentary, Citizens United and the Threat to the Regu-
latory State, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 16, 16, 19 (2010), http://www.michigan
lawreview.org/assets/fi/109/piety.pdf (suggesting that if corporations are entitled to full First
Amendment protection of political speech then it follows that corporations will also receive
full protection for their “core expressive activity,” which is defined as commercial speech).
The implications of Piety’s reasoning supports the conclusion that the distinction between
political speech and commercial speech will cease to exist.
204 130 S. Ct. at 882.
205 Id. at 899.
206 Justice Kennedy emphasized this point, writing “[c]orporations and other associations,
like individuals, contribute to the ‘discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information
and ideas’ that the First Amendment seeks to foster.” Id. at 900 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of
Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978)); see also Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius,
723 F.3d 1114, 1133–35 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 641 (2013) (applying
Citizens United to hold that a for-profit company’s free-exercise rights existed by extension
of its right to freely associate, finding “no reason the Supreme Court would recognize consti-
tutional protection for a corporation’s political expression but not its religious expression”).
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Although Button overturned state laws which banned political speech on the
major line of reasoning that the NAACP was a civil rights entity fighting for the
civil rights of African Americans, the distinction between speakers advocating for
civil rights and speakers advocating other causes may be blurred by Citizens United.
Professor David McGowan has pointed out that the distinction is already blurred
between the clearly political civil-rights cases and others:
The distinction between civil rights litigation and other cases is
elusive. Private benefits may be a small fraction of social bene-
fits in both overtly political cases and in seemingly ordinary
private disputes. A tenant seeking to avoid paying back rent
might try to persuade a court to adopt an implied warranty of
habitability, for example. If adopted, the warranty might provide
a defense for the tenant and alter housing practices in an entire
state. And overtly political challenges are sometimes brought
in the name of persons with at least a small stake in the result of
the case.207
Further lending credence to McGowan’s argument that the line between civil-rights
litigation and any other type of litigation is blurred, Kennedy also hammered home
that where a question exists about the speech protection that is warranted, the First
Amendment requires that the Court “give the benefit of any doubt to protecting
rather than stifling speech.”208 Prohibitive champerty laws functionally operate to
suppress content that may be infused into the courts and inherently political (and
First Amendment protected) legal process because only claims sanctioned by liti-
gants’ own self-acquired capital may find their way into the sphere.209
Champerty statutes such as Virginia’s or Florida’s, which fail to carve out an
exception for lenders who advance funds to plaintiffs to initiate and continue liti-
gation, place a restriction on corporate commercial speech and the entity’s ability
to associate freely with whomever it chooses.210 A strict scrutiny analysis under the
First Amendment as applied to these state champerty statutes might first examine
the statute under the content-based speech test. Champerty statutes which prohibit
a third party from taking an interest in litigation are content-based restrictions be-
cause they prohibit exercise of potential political speech based solely on the forum
in which that speech is delivered. Content-based speech restrictions, as the Supreme
207 McGowan, supra note 176, at 11.
208 130 S. Ct. at 891 (citing FEC v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 (2007)).
209 See Knake, supra note 86, at 36 (arguing that “[i]n the limited context of legal service
delivery . . . it is difficult to see how the Court can maintain this artificial distinction between
political versus commercial speech”).
210 See supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text.
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Court has held, are presumptively unconstitutional unless they are “narrowly tai-
lored to serve a compelling state interest.”211 Prior to Citizens United, the argument
that categorically prohibitory champerty statutes are narrowly tailored to serve the
government’s interests may have stood the test because the Government could
feasibly argue that it was trying protect the legal system from corporate influence.
In defending champerty statutes, the government would be predisposed to cite to a
number of state interests which reflect the legal and ethical concerns surrounding
third-party litigation.212 But no longer does it appear that the government will be
able to argue that champerty-prohibitive statutes protect the legal system from undue
corporate influence.213 Third-party litigation finance companies such as Burford and
Juridica will be able to argue that they have the same access rights to the courts as
do the NAACPs of the world. As quoted from Citizens United:
[T]hat “state law grants corporations special advantages—such
as limited liability, perpetual life, and favorable treatment of the
accumulation and distribution of assets” . . . does not suffice . . .
to allow laws prohibiting speech. “It is rudimentary that the
State cannot exact as the price of those special advantages the
forfeiture of First Amendment rights.”214
Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion supports the idea that the Supreme Court may
be inclined to expand First Amendment protection to corporate speech.215 Justice
Scalia explained that freedom of speech includes “the freedom to speak in associa-
tion with other individuals, including association in the corporate form.”216 In this
way, as Professor Knake has suggested, Citizens United should expand “to for-profit
corporations Button’s protections for the association of nonprofit corporations and
lawyers to deliver legal advice and advocacy.”217
211 See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 198 (1992) (plurality opinion); Austin v.
Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334
(1988) (plurality opinion); Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 573
(1987); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985); United
States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n,
460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
212 See supra Part I.B.
213 See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 884 (“[T]his Court now concludes that independent
expenditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the ap-
pearance of corruption.”).
214 Id. at 905 (quoting Austin, 494 U.S. at 658–59 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
215 See Knake, supra note 86, at 35 (stating that various freedoms apply to the corporate
form).
216 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 925 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Alito, J., and joined
in part by Thomas, J.).
217 Knake, supra note 86, at 35.
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CONCLUSION: THIRD-PARTY LITIGATION FINANCE REGULATION THAT
DOESN’T INFRINGE ON FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
Champerty laws that prohibit taking an interest in a lawsuit which categorically
bans all parties from taking an interest for profit are not narrowly tailored to protect
the government’s interests. As Jason Lyon has written, the doctrine of champerty is
obsolete and “appear[s] to run counter to our public policy goals . . . no longer
provid[ing] a valid justification for prohibiting third-party litigation funding.”218
Indeed, many states have already begun phasing out the doctrines of champerty.219
In the wake of Citizens United, free speech and the freedom to associate with whom-
ever one pleases despite one’s status as a corporate entity should act as the leading
argument to strike down any prohibitory champerty law which will prevent the
existence of litigation finance contracts.
This Note is certainly not advocating for the absence of any regulation of the
third-party litigation finance industry. Indeed, there are serious problems with allow-
ing an entity with a fiduciary duty to its investors to have too much control over a
lawsuit to which it is not a litigant-party.220 As states like Ohio have already done,
strong regulations should be promulgated. Third-party litigation financiers having
excessive control over a litigating party’s course of action in a lawsuit is extremely
problematic, and regulations which promote solutions to this problem are strongly
encouraged. These regulations should ensure that the conflicts between attorneys’
professional and ethical obligations and third-party litigation finance corporations’
fiduciary duties to their investors are addressed.
To preserve the interests of the plaintiff over the third-party lender, regulations
should be implemented which preserve attorney-client privilege and leave the legal
decisionmaking to the attorneys with the informed consent of their clients. Third-
party litigation finance agreements that include conditions that the financier be
apprised of developments in the case, even when those developments might be
privileged or involve disclosure of work product, are not inherently perverse to the
attorney-client privilege as long as those disclosures are kept confidential.221 Some
investors demand a say in choice of counsel, the right to participate in strategic deci-
sions, or the power to veto settlement offers.222 In order to avoid these potential
problems—where the third-party lenders overreach, have excessive control over the
lawsuit, and dictate strategy and decisionmaking to counsel—new regulations should
218 Lyon, supra note 29, at 589–90.
219 See supra Part II.C.
220 See supra Part I.B.
221 But see Robert C. Weber, IBM GC Says: Beware of Lenders Offering to Finance Your
Lawsuit, FORBES (Feb. 12, 2013, 7:55 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2013
/02/12/ibm-gc-says-beware-of-lenders-offering-to-finance-your-lawsuit/.
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ensure that third-party loans be made directly to litigants rather than to their attor-
neys. This will help “to avoid the potential conflict of interest between the attorney’s
duty of loyalty to clients and the financial obligation to lenders.”223
The problem of an increase in frivolous lawsuits is not exacerbated by the ab-
sence of champerty prohibition.224 Indeed, systemic procedural rules already exist225
which are designed to prevent the frivolous claim from entering court, and the
frivolity-increase argument assumes that third-party litigation financiers will not
have any filtering mechanisms of their own. But third-party litigation finance cor-
porations will ultimately seek out only those claims which have the highest likeli-
hood of success, and the spectrum of those cases will be far removed from the
spectrum of even the least frivolous of the suspect claims. Advocating for the abo-
lition of prohibitory champerty law is not analogous with a wild west scenario where
lenders run rampant; indeed many safeguards deemed constitutionally acceptable—
such as usury laws, the prohibition of lawyer fee-sharing with non-lawyers, or a
lawyer’s duty to exercise independent professional judgment—can help rein in the
evils that may still exist in robust market for third-party litigation funding.226
While Judge Taylor may need to find a new obscure doctrine to rely on to
dismiss the feuding families in his courtroom, the modern legal system has no place
for prohibitory champerty laws. First Amendment jurisprudence and the Supreme
Court’s ambivalence towards the identity of speakers confirms that categorically
prohibitive champerty is unconstitutional.
223 Lyon, supra note 29, at 609.
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225 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (requiring that an attorney perform a due diligence in-
vestigation concerning the factual basis for any claim or defense). Analogous state procedural
rules exist which perform the same frivolous-claim filtering function as Rule 11.
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